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Chicago’s Shifting Attitude Toward Concentrations of 
Business Power (1934–1962) 
Robert Van Horn† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The postwar Chicago School1 is commonly associated with a pro-
corporate standpoint because of its position toward antitrust law and 
business monopoly. For example, starting in the 1950s, Aaron Director—
who is often considered the father of Chicago law and economics—and 
his students, such as John McGee, defended the practices of the Standard 
Oil Company, arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding against the 
company in 1911 was erroneous.2 Since that time, Chicago has been as-
sociated with the position that competition has a self-correcting power, 
ensuring that monopoly power is short-lived. 
Members of the Chicago School did not always take a pro-
corporate position. In the 1930s, for example, the respected University of 
Chicago professor and self-identified classical liberal, Henry Simons, 
described monopoly in all its forms, including “gigantic corporations” 
and “other agencies for price control,” as “the great enemy of democra-
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cy.”3 For Simons, concentrations of power undermined the necessary 
condition for democracy to flourish, namely, a competitive market.4 Be-
sides Simons, Jacob Viner, the infamous Chicago price-theory guru and 
self-proclaimed classical liberal, also opposed concentrations of business 
power. Viner’s views on business monopoly in the late 1930s can be 
gleaned from his correspondence with Laird Bell, a distinguished attor-
ney and public benefactor of Chicago.5 In writing Bell, Viner acknowl-
edged that big business had some benefits, but emphasized, “[T]he mere 
size of business units tends almost inevitably to result in attempts to es-
cape the impact of competition which have important—and in my opi-
nion highly desirable—consequences for the operation of the economic 
system.”6 Viner considered this to be “the most important economic issue 
of our day” because “‘bigness’ . . . is the essential element in the faulty 
working . . . of our economic system.”7 
This Essay traces the development of the Chicago School’s chang-
ing position toward concentrations of business power. In Parts II and III, 
the Essay details the Chicago School’s early position of broad hostility 
toward concentrations of business power and its belief that such concen-
trations of power needed to be eradicated by vigorous antitrust enforce-
ment and radical corporate reform. Then, in Part IV, the Essay charts the 
Chicago School’s shift during the Free Market Study toward a broad ac-
ceptance of concentrations of power and a position that large corpora-
tions and industrial monopoly were relatively benign. This Essay argues 
that the Chicago School’s shift toward concentrations of power was a 
product of the postwar Chicago School’s effort to reconstitute liberalism 
as a bulwark against collectivist challenges and increasing government 
regulation of business. 
II. THE DECONCENTRATION OF POWER YEARS 
From the mid-1930s through the mid-1940s, among the economists 
(and economists in training) associated with the University of Chicago, 
there was a cohort of young economists—which included Henry Simons, 
Aaron Director, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler—who opposed 
concentrations of economic power on the basis of classical liberal doc-
trine. Simons was the public face of this group. According to the preemi-
                                                        
 3. HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 43 (1948). 
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 5. Jacob Viner Papers, Letter from Jacob Viner to Laird Bell, Box 3, Folder 33 (Nov. 16, 1937) 
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nent historian Ellis Hawley, Simons’s “widely read” 1934 pamphlet, A 
Positive Program for Laissez Faire, was at the vanguard of a barrage of 
arguments against increased concentration in industry.8 Indeed, by No-
vember of 1949, Simons’s pamphlet had sold nearly 24,000 copies.9 
Simons himself attributed his strong skepticism toward concentra-
tions of power to the classical liberal heritage of Chicago economics. 
Simons wrote: “A distinctive feature of ‘Chicago economics,’ as 
represented by Knight and Viner, is its traditional-liberal political philos-
ophy—its emphasis on the virtues of dispersion of economic power (free 
markets) and of political decentralization.”10 Indeed, Viner considered 
himself an “Old-English Liberal” and believed that opposition to mono-
poly power was a cornerstone of that faith.11 This echoed Viner’s under-
standing of Adam Smith. According to Viner, Smith believed that private 
monopoly corrupted the natural order on which all economic phenomena 
depended.12 
Simons located his own work squarely within the classical liberal 
tradition. The opening line of his Positive Program asserted: “This is 
frankly a propagandist tract—a defense of the thesis that traditional libe-
ralism offers . . . the best basis . . . for a program of economic reconstruc-
tion.”13 Indeed, Simons staunchly opposed the New Deal in his Positive 
Program precisely because it ignored the insights of Adam Smith, a 
point he made forcefully in 1933 when he addressed the Social Workers 
Discussion Group at the University of Chicago. Simons opened his talk 
with invective directed toward the Roosevelt Administration: 
We have called up all the expletives in condemning the policies of 
Mr. Hoover; and we need them all and more to express our feelings 
with regard to the present administration. . . . We now feel obliged 
to condemn [Roosevelt] for the opposite kind of error—for the wil-
lingness to tinker foolhardily with every exposed part of the eco-
nomic machine. . . . [T]he so-called brain-trust . . . needs nothing so 
badly as an understanding of Adam Smith.14 
                                                        
 8. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 292 (Fordham Univ. 
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Simons is significant because, as we will see below, he influenced 
the bright young minds of some of the later leaders of the postwar Chi-
cago School with his pamphlet, which many of his colleagues considered 
the pinnacle of his scholarly work.15 Consequently, to appreciate the 
Chicago classical liberals and the postwar Chicago School’s shift in atti-
tude regarding concentrations of business power, it is useful to closely 
look at Simons’s Positive Program, particularly portions concerning the 
concentrations of business power. 
In the spirit of classical liberalism, Simons observed: 
The great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms: gigan-
tic corporations, trade associations and other agencies for price con-
trol, trade-unions—or, in general, organization and concentration of 
power within functional classes.16 
For Simons, concentrations of power in the market had perilous ramifica-
tions. Concentrations of power posed a threat to the price system, the 
sine qua non of freedom. Using his monopoly power, a monopolist could 
cause commodities to be traded at prices that failed to reflect underlying 
social scarcities. Since a monopoly could exert a tremendous power in 
order to exploit society and sabotage the economy, the state must, as Si-
mons put it, “destroy” that monopoly.17 If the state acted otherwise, the 
consequence, according to Simons, would be “a usurpation of sovereign-
ty” by the monopolists and perhaps even, “a domination of the state by 
them.”18 
Simons believed that the proliferation of monopoly had led to the 
Depression and the dissolution of economic efficiency.19 The societal 
consequences of the growth in monopoly, according to Simons, were 
deplorable: “The gains from monopoly organization in general are likely, 
of course, to accrue predominantly to the strong and to be derived at the 
expense of the weak.”20 As a result, monopoly power, especially in the 
hands of large corporations, tended to create gross inequality, both in 
terms of power and income. Simons maintained: 
An important factor in existing inequality . . . is the gigantic corpo-
ration. We may recognize, in the almost unlimited grants of powers 
                                                        
 15. For evidence that Simons’s Positive Program was the pinnacle of his work, see SPRL, 
supra note 10, and see Aaron Director, Prefatory Note, in SIMONS, supra note 3, at v–vii. 
 16. SIMONS, supra note 3, at 43. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Simons defined “economic efficiency” as “an allocation such that units of every kind of 
productive service make equally important (valuable) contributions to the social product in all the 
different uses among which they are transferable.” Id. at 47. 
 20. Id. at 49. 
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to corporate bodies, one of the greatest sins of government against 
the free-enterprise system. There is . . . no reasonable excuse . . . for 
hundred-million-dollar corporations, no matter what form their 
property may take. Even if the much-advertised economies of gi-
gantic financial combinations were real, sound policy would wisely 
sacrifice these economies to preservation of more economic free-
dom and equality.21 
Further, Simons derided anyone who supported the status quo, with its 
great concentrations of power and gross income inequality: “Surely there 
is something unlovely, to modern as against medieval minds, about 
marked inequality of either kind.”22 
Simons called for an “outright dismantling of . . . gigantic corpora-
tions” and “persistent prosecution” of producers who organized to re-
strict output or maintain price.23 He championed “unqualified repudiation 
of the so-called ‘rule of reason,’” which he claimed granted absurd pow-
ers to corporations.24 He warned of the dangers of private mergers that 
resulted in monopoly power, “regardless of how reasonably that power 
may appear to be exercised,” and recommended that vertical integration 
be permitted only when it did not harm the maintenance of effective 
competition.25 Simons demanded vigorous antitrust enforcement, main-
taining that an antitrust violation ought to be considered “a major crime” 
and “prosecuted unremittingly” by the Federal Trade Commission, 
whose power, according to Simons, needed to be increased.26 In sum, 
according to Simons, “there must be a complete ‘new deal’ with respect 
to the private corporation. . . . [The] corporation is simply running away 
with our economic (and political) system.”27 
Even though Simons acknowledged that the corporate firm served a 
useful social function by pooling resources in order to take advantage of 
otherwise unattainable economies of scale, corporate power had to be 
checked by clearly established rules of the game. Simons’s recommenda-
tions for corporate reform included: (1) the federal government, not 
states, should charter corporations, and existing state-granted charters 
                                                        
 21. Id. at 52. 
 22. Id. at 51. 
 23. Id. at 58. 
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 26. In the mid-1940s, Simons also demonstrated his opposition to concentrations of business 
power when he approved of the role antitrust law played in preventing business monopoly. Indeed, 
Simons praised the antitrust crusade of Thurman Arnold, head of the United States Antitrust Divi-
sion in the Department of Justice from 1937 to 1943. Simons had great admiration for Arnold: “One 
cannot deny that Arnold has done a magnificent job. The record is impressive, even when one makes 
every allowance for the favorable circumstances which he faced.” Id. at 100. 
 27. Id. at 58. 
1532 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1527 
should be annulled; (2) a corporation that manufactures or sells goods 
and services should not have an ownership interest in another corpora-
tion; and (3) all corporations should have the amount of property they 
own limited, which should ensure that no single corporation dominates 
an industry.28 
Besides an “outright dismantling” of large corporations, Simons al-
so called for a complete overhaul of the patent system. Simons con-
demned the patent system because it enabled firms to restrict competi-
tion, both actual and potential, and thereby augment their monopoly 
power. After publishing his Positive Program, Simons observed: “It is 
shameful to have permitted . . . the gross abuse of patent privilege for 
extortion, exclusion, and output restriction.”29 Simons believed that just 
as free trade required equal and free access to markets, industrial re-
search required equal and reasonable access, if not wholly free access, to 
technical knowledge, whether patented or unpatented. Simons especially 
criticized large corporations because their size enabled them to abuse the 
status quo patent system to the detriment of smaller firms. 
Some of Simons’s policy recommendations in his Positive Program 
run counter to classical liberalism, such as his call to gradually national-
ize all industries for which competition could not serve as an effective 
regulatory agency. These recommendations should be understood not as 
a departure from classical liberalism, but rather as an attempt to address 
the exceptional economic circumstances of the Great Depression in the 
spirit of classical liberalism. It is worth noting that Simons himself pri-
vately confessed to using a “low, debating trick” when he called for the 
nationalization of certain industries in his Positive Program.30 Indeed, 
Simons recommended nationalization because he feared the alternative: 
extensive private monopoly regulated by government.31 
                                                        
 28. It is worth noting that Simons continued to oppose concentrations of business power and to 
adhere to the policy recommendations about corporations that he made in his Positive Program well 
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cians, and persisting mainly to preserve the power of control groups and to reward unna-
turally an admittedly rare talent for holding together enterprise aggregations which ought 
to collapse from excessive size. 
SIMONS, supra note 3, at 246. 
 29. SIMONS, supra note 3, at 130. 
 30. SPRL, supra note 10, Box 3, File 40 (Dec. 18, 1934). 
 31. Id. 
2011] Chicago’s Shifting Attitude 1533 
In the conclusion of his pamphlet, Simons emphasized that his anti-
monopoly, anti-gigantic-corporation proposals would not only serve to 
help to maintain liberty, but also prevent another depression from hap-
pening in the future. In closing his Positive Program, Simons called for 
the “custodians of the great liberal tradition” to join him in order to stop 
the movement toward collectivism in the United States.32 Two young 
scholars swiftly responded to Simons’s call: Allen Wallis and George 
Stigler. Graduate students at the University of Chicago at that time, Wal-
lis and Stigler wrote an editorial in the New York Times entitled Prob-
lems of Competition. Criticizing a previously published editorial, written 
by a layperson, they demonstrated their anti-monopoly bias, stating: “It 
is . . . not correct to say that imperfect competition might by chance 
‘work out well for the common good’” because convincing evidence 
demonstrated that “monopolization reduces the national income.”33 
In a different editorial, Stigler and Wallis adduced Simons’s Posi-
tive Program as an exemplar of great scholarship: “[E]conomics enables 
us to formulate . . . concrete and practical proposals for social policies, 
such, for example, as that contained in Professor Henry Simons’s bril-
liant and suggestive ‘A Positive Program for Laissez Faire.’”34 Indeed, in 
his memoirs, Stigler later acknowledged that Simons’s Positive Program 
deeply influenced him;35 until the 1950s, he believed in the need for ro-
bust anti-monopoly policies to safeguard competition.  
Besides Stigler and Wallis, Milton Friedman was among the admir-
ers of Simons’s Positive Program closely affiliated with the University 
of Chicago. Since opposition to concentrations of business power was a 
central theme of Simons’s pamphlet, this suggests that Friedman too ad-
hered to Simons’s classical liberal view on this matter. Friedman later 
stated, “I thought at the time that [Simons’s pamphlet] was strongly pro 
free market in orientation”;36 for Friedman, calling a work “strongly pro 
free market” amounted to high praise. 
Aaron Director also praised Simons’s pamphlet highly, which, ac-
cording to Director, provided the bedrock for Simons’s scholarship.37 
Like Simons, Director also attacked concentrations of power in the mar-
ket. In 1933, when commenting on business power, Director said: 
                                                        
 32. SIMONS, supra note 3, at 77. 
 33. Allen Wallis & George Stigler, Letter to the Editor, Problems of Competition, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 1934, at 22. 
 34. Allen Wallis & George Stigler, Letter to the Editor, Professor Simons’ Book, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 1934, at 12. 
 35. See generally GEORGE STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST (1988). 
 36. Edmund W. Kitch, ed., The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chi-
cago, 1932–1970, 26 J. L. & ECON. 163, 178 (1983). 
 37. Director, supra note 15. 
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“Adam Smith said all that needs to be said on this point: ‘People of the 
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some con-
trivance to raise prices.’”38 Director’s critical attitude toward concentra-
tions of power is not surprising given that Director was Simons’s “best 
friend” and was “considerably influenced [by Simons’s] views.”39 
Notably, at this juncture, the later leaders of the postwar Chicago 
School—Friedman, Director, Stigler, and Wallis—all extolled Simons’s 
Positive Program and held Simons in high esteem. 
III. ECHOING SIMONS ON THE MONT 
As WWII drew to a close, the liberal faith was nearly extinct. Many 
adherents of liberalism, both in Europe and the United States, thought 
they needed to create a more robust liberalism to prevent its extinction 
and thereby countervail the threat of totalitarianism. To accomplish this 
feat, they organized to investigate and debate aspects of the classical lib-
eral doctrine, including how to deal with business organization, such as 
business monopoly and corporations. The two organized efforts that in-
volved the Chicago classical liberals were the Mont Pelerin Society and 
the Free Market Study. First, this Part turns to the Mont Pelerin Society. 
Then, Part IV addresses the Free Market Study. 
The Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), a transnational institutional 
project, sought to reinvent a liberalism that had some prospect of chal-
lenging collectivist doctrines (Keynesianism, institutional reformism, and 
socialism) ascendant in the immediate postwar period. Led by F. A. 
Hayek, the Society enabled its members—liberals from America (many 
who represented the Chicago School) and Europe—to debate and offer 
each other mutual support. At the first meeting in 1947, its members de-
bated multifarious topics, including “The Future of Germany,” “The 
Problems and Chances of European Federation,” “Liberalism and Chris-
tianity,” and “Modern Historiography and Political Education.” The 
opening session, which was on “‘Free’ Enterprise or Competitive Order,” 
was, in Hayek’s opinion, the one in which the vast majority of the mem-
bers would be interested.40 
                                                        
 38. AARON DIRECTOR, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOCRACY 24 (1933). 
 39. Ronald Coase, Aaron Director, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
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 40. Aaron Director Papers, Box 1, Folder: Correspondence 1946–1952 (Feb. 14, 1947) (on file 
with Regenstein Library, University of Chicago) [hereinafter DPRL]. Notably, after the first Mont 
Pelerin meeting, several charter members drew up a “Draft Statement of Aims” of the Mont Pelerin 
Society. In the statement, point five demonstrates the pivotal importance of the competitive order to 
its framers: 
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For MPS members, the main reason the topic of free enterprise or 
competitive order loomed large was due to the position of their oppo-
nents on the Left, the collectivists. Since the start of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Left had argued that business monopoly had been expanding 
throughout the western world and predicted that competition would not 
be able to stop this inexorable growth. Thus, the economy would soon be 
inevitably controlled by industrial monopolies.41 Consequently, the Left 
claimed that state control of the economy was the only viable solution. 
This argument threatened the liberal doctrine, especially its tenet that 
effective competition existed or had the potential to exist. 
Director, along with Hayek and Walter Eucken, delivered an ad-
dress on “‘Free’ Enterprise or Competitive Order.” In many ways, Direc-
tor’s address echoed Simons. Speaking with the sense of urgency that 
Simons conveyed in his Positive Program, Director maintained that 
harmful state intervention had become regrettably prevalent, that the 
western world was rapidly shifting from individualism to authority, and 
that some countries had completed the shift and consequently no longer 
supported the virtues of individual freedom.42 Director highlighted the 
collectivist allegation that because of the tremendous increase in effi-
ciency of large-scale business enterprise and because of the inevitability 
of monopoly, it would be imprudent to prevent enterprises from becom-
ing monopolies.43 Director maintained that this allegation contributed to 
the trend toward central planning and the suppression of individual free-
dom.44 
Director emphasized that the substantial amount of state interven-
tion responsible for the destruction of the economy resulted from the fact 
that liberal doctrine was not robust enough.45 He observed that, even 
though the founders of liberalism endeavored to minimize the role of the 
state, the task of his day was to redefine the role of the state.46 To begin 
to address this question, Director focused on the fundamental question of 
                                                                                                                            
The preservation of an effective competitive order depends upon a proper legal and insti-
tutional framework. The existing framework must be considerably modified to make the 
operation of competition more efficient and beneficial. The precise character of the legal 
and institutional framework within which competition will work most effectively and 
which will supplement the working of competition is an urgent problem on which contin-
ued exchange of views is required. 
R.M. HARTWELL, A HISTORY OF THE MONT PELERIN SOCIETY 49 (1995). 
 41. See, e.g., LORIE TARSHIS, THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (1946). 
 42. Mont Pelerin Society, Records of the 1947 meeting (on file with Liberaal Archief, Ghent, 
Belgium) [hereinafter MPS1947LA]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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how the legal framework ought to be altered in order to make competi-
tion work effectively—that is, how to design a “competitive order.”47 
Director viewed this task as necessary in order to counter the trend to-
ward collectivism.48 Like Simons, Director asserted that designing an 
effective competitive order was vital to address the immense problem of 
concentrations of power.49 
Director maintained that one central role of the state in the imme-
diate post-WWII period had to be prevention of business monopoly pow-
er, thereby promoting freedom by dispersing concentrated market pow-
er.50 While Director acknowledged that international trade substantially 
checked the growth of industrial monopoly, he admonished that interna-
tional trade was an insufficient check.51 Director cited England as an ex-
ample.52 He blamed England’s overconfidence in the ability of interna-
tional trade to eliminate monopoly as a significant cause of the relatively 
large number of monopolies in England.53 Although he expressed quali-
fied praise for the enforcement of American antitrust law, Director sug-
gested that more vigorous antitrust enforcement was necessary to address 
the substantial amount of monopoly power.54 
On the basis of his study of antitrust cases, Director condemned pa-
tents without qualification as a means of solidifying and extending mo-
nopoly power.55 From 1939 to 1947, the Supreme Court had condemned 
the use of patents to monopolize industry or stifle competition in nearly a 
dozen antitrust cases.56 To address the patent problem, according to Di-
rector, the patent system needed to be overhauled. For example, he rec-
ommended that the period during which a patent protected its holder be 
significantly reduced.57 
                                                        
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. To create a working competitive order, Director, like Simons, advocated state action on 
three fronts: (1) preventing private monopoly; (2) controlling combinations among workers and 
businesses; and (3) providing monetary stability. Because of the scope of issues examined in this 
Essay, only (1) and (2) will be addressed below. 
 50. MPS1947LA, supra note 42. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1947); United States v. Nat’l 
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 
406–07 (1945); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944); 
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Cont’l Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944); United States v. Masonite Corp., 
316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); B. B. Chem. 
Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 497–98 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 
491–92 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 452–53 (1940). 
 57. MPS1947LA, supra note 42, at 79. 
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Director also blamed the status quo corporate law as a primary 
cause of the concentration of power in the economy. In the spirit of Si-
mons, Director took a strong line and called for the removal of the “un-
limited power of corporations.”58 To accomplish this feat, Director sug-
gested that radical corporate reform was necessary. Echoing Simons’s 
ideas in his Positive Program, Director recommended limiting the size of 
corporations, eliminating interlocking directorates, forbidding harmful 
mergers, circumscribing the scope of corporate activities, and more. 
At the time of his address to the MPS, Director shared Simons’s 
disdain for concentrated power because it ultimately undermined free-
dom. In short, Director was convinced that industrial monopoly needed 
to be prevented, and he harbored strong reservations against large corpo-
rations. His attitude, however, as well as that of other key figures of Chi-
cago School, would begin to shift by the early 1950s. 
IV. THE FREE MARKET STUDY: CHICAGO’S SHIFTING POSITION ON 
CONCENTRATIONS OF BUSINESS POWER 
A. Classical Liberalism’s Continued Dominance in the Early Years 
In America, the central base for the reconstitution of liberalism was 
the University of Chicago Law School. Hayek had acquired funding 
from a right-wing foundation, the Volker Fund, to set up a research 
project called the Free Market Study (FMS) (1946–1952).59 The MPS 
and the FMS were joined at the hip at birth—both sought to investigate a 
number of legal and policy areas in order to move toward effective com-
petition.60 
In the fall of 1946, the FMS commenced because of the persistent 
efforts of Hayek and the work of Director and Simons.61 Its members 
were Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, Edward Levi, Garfield Cox, Theo-
dore Schultz, and Wilbur Katz, and its leader was Director. In an outline 
he drew up for the FMS, Director, echoing Simons, called for limitations 
on corporate size and for federal incorporation to be required, for the 
successes and failures of antitrust law to be investigated, and for patent 
policy to be reconsidered. Consequently, the FMS studied numerous is-
sues concerning the concentrations of power. 
                                                        
 58. Id. 
 59. For a detailed account on how the FMS came to fruition, see Robert Van Horn & Philip 
Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism, in THE 
ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN 139 (P. Mirowski & D. Plehwe eds., 2009). 
 60. Id. 
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During the early years of the FMS (1946–1949), its members were 
uncertain how exactly to reinvigorate the liberal doctrine in order to un-
dermine collectivism. Like Director during his 1947 Mont Pelerin ad-
dress, FMS members, as we will see below, echoed Chicago classical 
liberalism, expressing concerns about concentrations of power, including 
industrial monopoly. The FMS convened regularly and enabled its mem-
bers to discuss and debate how to reformulate liberalism. Because of the 
perceived strength of collectivism, the FMS undertook its task with a 
sense of urgency. Indeed, Hayek, in 1949, said: “The intellectual revival 
of liberalism is already under way. . . . Will it be in time?”62  
Like in his 1947 MPS address, Director explicitly conveyed at the 
early meetings that the liberal doctrine needed to be reconstituted. At the 
second meeting of the FMS, Director distributed a research proposal en-
titled “A Program of Factual Research into Questions Basic to the For-
mulation of a Liberal Economic Policy.” Through empirical investiga-
tion, Director sought to find a more robust liberal policy and thereby 
counterattack collectivism. 
Although the FMS could have pursued numerous research avenues, 
after the first couple of meetings, it quickly narrowed its focus to issues 
concerning monopoly and corporations—i.e., concentrations of business 
power. This suggests that the FMS, like the opening session of the MPS, 
sought to respond to the collectivists’ view of business monopoly. 
In mid-November of 1946, the FMS addressed the issue of industri-
al concentration. Director essentially offered two alternative, competing 
explanations for the existence of concentrations of business power: 
(1) the status quo level of concentration was politically objectionable 
because it perpetuated inequality and promoted inefficiency; or (2) the 
existing level of concentration was, in the main, competitive and resulted 
in the most efficacious use of resources.63 The former echoed Simons 
and Director’s 1947 MPS lecture; the latter gave voice to the view typi-
cally associated with the postwar Chicago School—i.e., concentrations 
of business power are relatively benign. Because Director gave his MPS 
address less than six months after he proffered these two explanations, it 
is reasonable to infer that he espoused the first of the two explanations at 
this time. That is, he saw business monopoly as the problem as opposed 
to the solution. 
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Before the 1947 MPS meeting, the FMS also considered the topic 
of barriers to entry.64 Even though the Chicago School became known 
for claiming that barriers to entry erected by businesses themselves were 
essentially a myth,65 Director and the other members took the notion of 
barriers to entry seriously enough at this juncture to discuss and debate it. 
Director pointed out that many barriers to entry had been created by gov-
ernment to supposedly further consumer interest.66 Instead of blaming 
the government for being captured by corporations, however, he sug-
gested corporations were the source of the problem.67 In doing so, Direc-
tor reasoned in accord with Chicago classical liberalism because, like he 
did in 1933, he viewed corporations with suspicion and suggested con-
centrations of business power were harmful to the economy.68 
Besides Director, other members of the FMS, such as Levi and 
Friedman, also voiced concerns about concentrations of business power 
during early years of the FMS.69 Levi revealed his opposition to concen-
trations of power through his activities outside of the FMS. In 1947, at a 
Chicago Round Table radio discussion, Levi spoke with Wendell Berge 
and James Martin, who Levi called “valiant fighters against monopoly,” 
who were “willing to go against size as such and to see to it that the 
American way of life—the competitive way—is preserved.”70 Berge was 
the former Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, and 
Martin was chief of the Decartelization Branch of the United States Of-
fice of Military Government for Germany. Together they discussed the 
issue of monopoly and antitrust law enforcement in the United States and 
in Germany.71 They lamented the continuing presence of concentrations 
of business power. Levi probably best captured their concerns about the 
                                                        
 64. Conventionally, these barriers included: the availability of raw resources; unfair competi-
tion—like boycotts or predatory activities; the control of methods or means of distribution—like 
exclusive dealerships or advertising trademarks; and the control over credit resources. 
 65. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 226–27 
(1985). 
 66. TSPR, supra note 63, Box 39 (addenda), Folder: Free Market Study (Feb. 26, 1947). 
 67. Id. 
 68. This stands in stark contrast with the later Chicago position, which states that corporations 
capture the regulatory process, and hence government cannot be trusted to devise economic policy. 
 69. Since little is known about Levi relative to Friedman, it is worth saying a few words about 
him here. Levi received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1935. He received his 
J.S.D. degree from Yale in 1938. From 1940 to 1945, Levi served as Special Assistant to the Attor-
ney General, and Levi worked under Thurmond Arnold in the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice. Coming to the University of Chicago Law School in 1946, Levi worked as a professor. 
From 1950 to 1962, Levi served as Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, becoming Presi-
dent of the University of Chicago in 1968. 
 70. Edward Hirsch Levi, Wendell Berge & James Martin, Are We Against Monopoly, 1 U. CHI. 
ROUND TABLE PAMPHLETS 1, 19 (1947). 
 71. Id. at 2. 
1540 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1527 
United States when he stated, “there is enormous concentration in the 
American economy today and an enormous amount of monopoly.”72 In a 
1947 article, Levi expressed similar concerns about concentration in the 
United States economy, attributing its cause partly to ineffectual antitrust 
law enforcement.73 
Like Levi, Friedman also expressed concerns. At a meeting in early 
January of 1947, Friedman, in the spirit of Chicago classical liberalism, 
proposed that the FMS should investigate the issue of the separation of 
corporate ownership and corporate control.74 He emphasized the social 
disadvantages that stemmed from the separation of ownership from con-
trol, including the fact that this separation facilitated the securing of mo-
nopoly power.75 In response to this problem, Friedman prescribed in-
creasing the ownership interest of the corporate directors: “By identify-
ing ownership with control, the proposal would eliminate many of the 
present abuses of the corporate form. It would immediately eliminate 
holding companies . . . [and] it would make mergers more difficult.”76 
Friedman hoped the result would break up large corporations and lessen 
industrial monopoly. 
B. The Rise of Neoliberalism in the Later Years 
During the latter part of the FMS (1950–1952), attitudes toward 
concentrations of business power shifted, and a new form of liberalism 
began to emerge. In accord with Director’s mandate that the FMS inves-
tigate the facts taken for granted by liberals, the FMS funded empirical 
investigations, including one by Warren Nutter.77 Writing his dissertation 
in association with the FMS and under the supervision of Director, O.H. 
Brownlee, and Milton Friedman, Nutter undertook an empirical study of 
the extent of business monopoly in the United States and found that there 
had been no significant increase in business monopoly since 1900.78 
Since the Left had maintained that monopoly had been increasing by 
leaps and bounds, Nutter’s investigation dealt a sharp blow by suggesting 
that the Left had exaggerated the growth of monopoly and thus was mis-
taken about its inevitability. 
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This reorientation toward concentrations of business power first 
showed up in Director’s review of Charles Lindblom’s Unions and Capi-
talism.79 Director maintained that the market system, due to the “corrod-
ing influence of competition,” tended to “destroy” monopoly in all its 
forms.80 This sharply contrasted with Simons, who feared monopoly in 
all its forms would eventually undermine democracy unless corporate 
reform and vigorous antitrust law enforcement were undertaken. Moreo-
ver, Director’s position starkly departed from his own position in his 
1947 MPS address. In 1950, therefore, Director departed from the Chi-
cago classical liberal position and showed a new faith in the power of 
competition by suggesting concentrations of business power were rela-
tively benign. 
In 1951, in consonance with his changed attitude toward business 
monopoly, Director expressed his revised views of corporations. Accord-
ing to Director, the corporate form was ideal because it did not contribute 
toward business monopoly and because it approximated the impersonal 
ideal of the market.81 Director maintained that competitive forces could 
sufficiently control corporations, even large ones.82 Furthermore, Direc-
tor, in contrast to Friedman’s 1947 concern, asserted that although the 
separation of corporate ownership and corporate control did seem to be 
problematic, the capital market tended to ameliorate this divergence.83 
Therefore, Director sharply departed from Simons’s mandate (and his 
own in 1947) that radical corporate reform needed to be undertaken to 
check the power of large corporations. In sum, for Director, concentrated 
markets tended to be efficient, regardless of the size of the corporations. 
Less than five years after the FMS began, Director’s 1946 specula-
tion about the power of competition—i.e., “monopoly tends to disappear 
and competition to revive even where once dormant”—became, for the 
Chicago School, an assertion of fact; competition undermines all forms 
of monopoly. This marked a crucial watershed in the emergence of a new 
liberalism (or neoliberalism) at Chicago. 
As the FMS ended, its sister project, the Antitrust Project, began in 
1952, and the reconsiderations of liberalism proceeded. Director headed 
the project; Edward Levi assisted. The members included John McGee, 
William Letwin, Robert Bork, and Ward Bowman. The Antitrust Project 
focused on issues of monopoly, select areas of antitrust law, and the his-
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tory of the Sherman Act.84 It investigated these topics in light of the con-
clusions of the FMS. Moreover, in the spirit of the FMS’s attempt to in-
fluence policy, it investigated these topics with a critical eye toward U.S. 
antitrust law precedent, and many of the conclusions of the Antitrust 
Project contravened the conclusions of the courts. In 1954, for instance, 
Bork, in contrast to Director’s classical liberal concern in 1947 about the 
excessive size of corporations and their concentrated economic power, 
maintained that “[vertical mergers added] nothing to monopoly power.”85 
This Chicago neoliberal position suggested, therefore, that vertical mer-
gers should always be legal. Consequently, Bork suggested that one as-
pect of antitrust law precedent, which required an investigation of mo-
tives of a vertical merger in order to make a determination of its legality, 
was not only extraneous, but also erroneous.86 
Bork’s article fell under the Antitrust Project’s umbrella article and 
manifesto, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, by Director and Levi, 
which they published in 1956.87 In this article, Director and Levi demon-
strated skepticism about the extension of monopoly power through the 
use of exclusionary practices, such as tying arrangements, and a conco-
mitant disdain for adjudication or legislation that regarded these practices 
as per se deleterious or as per se illegal.88 Director and Levi suggested 
that exclusionary practices, including ones that involved patents, were no 
worse than harmless price discrimination and served as either competi-
tive tactics equally available to all businesses or means of maximizing 
returns on an established market position. Notably, Bork and Bowman 
concurred with this description.89 They asserted, “Director’s analysis in-
dicates that absent special factors that have not been shown to exist, so-
called exclusionary practices are not means of injuring the competitive 
process.” Thus, Director and Levi maintained that when the courts 
deemed it necessary to consider the legality of an exclusionary practice, 
they should use a rule of reason analysis, not a per se approach. This 
sharply contrasted with Simons who claimed a rule of reason analysis 
granted absurd powers to corporations. 
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Thus, the later years of the FMS, as well as the early years of the 
Antitrust Project, demonstrated a significant departure from the Chicago 
School’s early suspicion of concentrations of business power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1959, about fifteen years after Simons’s untimely death in 1946, 
Viner delivered the second annual “Henry Simons Lecture.”90 In the 
course of his lecture, Viner again demonstrated his hostility toward big 
business and concentrations of power, and he rooted this hostility in the 
tradition of Adam Smith: 
The classical exponents of laissez faire always qualified their enthu-
siasm for the free market by the condition that it should be a com-
petitive market. Adam Smith . . . intensely disliked monopoly in all 
its forms. He regarded merchants as perpetual seekers of monopoly 
power. Also, because he thought that in all but routine activities 
they would inevitably be inefficient, he disliked all large-scale pri-
vately owned companies.91 
In light of this classical liberal view of monopoly, Viner lamented the 
state of the contemporary market structure: “[M]onopoly is so prevalent 
in the markets of the western world today.”92 Indeed, Viner claimed that 
anyone who championed the virtues of the competitive market as if it 
existed or would exist in the future egregiously overlooked the ubiquity 
of monopoly. Viner called for a challenge to monopoly practices: “Given 
the prevalence or danger of substantial intrusion of monopoly into the 
market, the logic of the laissez faire defense of the market against state-
intervention collapses and there is called for instead, by its very logic, 
state-suppression or state-regulation of monopoly practices.”93 
Even though Viner advocated the suppression and regulation of 
monopoly, and thereby indicated that the government needed to adopt a 
positive role in the economy, he still considered himself a proponent of a 
classical liberalism or, in his words, an “Old-English Liberal[ism].”94 
Indeed, Viner indicated that classical liberals sometimes had to advocate 
a positive state role “in the case of emergency or abnormal conditions.”95 
Viner’s classical liberal opposition to monopoly power motivated his call 
to positive state action. Likewise, Viner suggested that Simons’s Positive 
                                                        
 90. The Chicago Law School established a lecture series in honor of Henry Simons, and 
George Stigler gave the premier lecture. See VPML, supra note 5, Box 8, Folder 21 (Oct. 22, 1958). 
 91. Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 65 (1960). 
 92. Id. at 66. 
 93. Id. at 67. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 46. 
1544 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1527 
Program in 1934 was in the spirit of classical liberalism and was an at-
tempt to use positive state action to address an economic emergency, the 
Great Depression, which Simons had claimed stemmed to a large extent 
from large corporations and monopoly power.96 
Contrasting Viner’s conception of concentrations of business power 
with the post-1950 perception of Director and Friedman is instructive. In 
the 1950s and early 1960s, Director and Friedman trumpeted the benefits 
of the competitive market. Indeed, in Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman 
echoed the conclusion of the FMS that the extent of the industrial mono-
poly was not a serious problem, and he claimed that because of this and 
because he presumed that large corporations approximated the imperson-
al ideal of the market there was, in his words, “[a] wide . . . range 
of . . . industries for which it is appropriate to treat the economy as if it 
were competitive.”97 In his 1959 address, Viner, however, viewed proc-
lamations of the benefits of free competitive markets and statements that 
concentrations of business power were not pervasive as pernicious. 
Commenting on the enormity of the concentration of power in the econ-
omy, Viner said: “[D]iscussion of the merits of the free competitive mar-
ket as if that were what we were living with or were at all likely to have 
the good fortune to live with in the future seem to me academic in the 
only pejorative sense of that adjective.”98 The contrast between Viner’s 
perception of business monopoly and Friedman’s perception of it is stark 
because Viner remained rooted in the classical liberal tradition of Chica-
go School economics and never adopted the Chicago neoliberal position 
that large corporations and industrial monopoly were relatively benign. 
In 1983, about twenty years after Viner delivered his Chicago Law 
School speech, Director, Friedman, Stigler, and other members of the 
Chicago School gathered to reflect on the rise of the postwar Chicago 
School.99 During their colloquy, they conversed about Simons’s Positive 
Program. Even though Director, Friedman, Stigler, and Wallis all had 
extolled Simons’s pamphlet prior to the rise of Chicago neoliberalism, 
they offered Simons’s work only faint applause—if any applause at all. If 
they had discussed Viner’s Chicago Law School address, they, in all li-
kelihood, would have frowned upon their former teacher’s strong opposi-
tion to concentrations of power and his endorsement of Simons’s Posi-
tive Program. Much had changed since the time that they were all Chi-
cago classical liberals. 
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